SCG, Book I, Chapter 33

Chapter 33: THAT NOT ALL NAMES ARE SAID OF GOD AND CREATURES IN A PURELY EQUIVOCAL WAY
[Caput Triginta Tres: Quod non omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis pure aequivoce]

[1] … [N]ot everything predicated of God and other things is said in a purely equivocal way, in the manner of equivocals by chance [sicut ea quae sunt a casu aequivoca].

The annotated edition has it: "The theological and devotional terms which we derive from creatures and apply to God are not as the Aristotelian homonyma, where, under sameness of name, two different senses are expressed of two entirely different thing [sic], mere namesakes and nothing more, as when we call a post alike a log stuck in the ground and a delivery of letters."

[2] For in equivocals by chance [a casu aequivoca] there is no order or reference of one to another [nullus ordo aut respectus attenditur unius ad alterum], but it is entirely accidental that one name is applied to diverse things: the application of the name to one of them does not signify that it has an order to the other. But this is not the situation with names said of God and creatures, since we note in the community of such names the order of cause and effect [in huiusmodi nominum communitate ordo causae et causati]…. It is not, therefore, in the manner of pure equivocation [secundum puram aequivocationem] that something is predicated of God and other things.

[3] Furthermore, where there is pure equivocation, there is no likeness in things themselves; there is only the unity of a name. But, as is clear from what we have said, there is a certain mode of likeness of things to God [rerum autem ad Deum est aliquis modus similitudinis; cf. SCG, I, 29]. It remains, then, that names are not said of God in a purely equivocal way.

[4] Moreover, when one name is predicated of several things in a purely equivocal way, we cannot from one of them be led to the knowledge of another; for the knowledge of things does not depend on [vocal] words, but on the meaning of names [cognitio rerum non dependet ex vocibus, sed ex nominum ratione]. Now, from what we find in other things, we do arrive at a knowledge of divine things, as is evident from what we have said [cf. SCG, I, 28]. Such names, then, are not said of God and other things in a purely equivocal way.

The annotated edition seems to translate dependet ex vocibus as "by a mere coincidence of sound".

[5] Again, equivocation in a name impedes the process of reasoning [Adhuc. Aequivocatio nominis processum argumentationis impedit]. If, then, nothing was said of God and creatures except in a purely equivocal way, no reasoning proceeding from creatures to God could take place. But, the contrary is evident from [Cuius contrarium patet ex] all those who have spoken about God.

[6] … [A] name is predicated of some being uselessly unless through that name we understand something of the being [Frustra aliquod nomen de aliquo praedicatur nisi per illud nomen aliquid de eo intelligamus]. But, if names are said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way, we understand nothing of God through those names; for the meanings of those names are known to us solely to the extent that they are said of creatures. In vain, therefore, would it be said or proved of God that He is a being, good, or the like.

[7] Should it be replied that through such names we know only what God is not, namely, that God is called living because He does not belong to the genus of lifeless things, and so with the other names, it will at least have to be the case that living said of God and creatures agrees in the denial of the lifeless. Thus, it will not be said in a purely equivocal way.

As the annotated edition remarks, "St Thomas says what suffices for his present argument: he is not undertaking to exhaust the sense of the phrase 'living God.'" The upshot of this chapter is that we do have some positive knowledge of God by the very act of articulating the (apophatic) limits thereof.

SCG, Book I, Chapter 31

Chapter 31: THAT THE DIVINE PERFECTION AND THE PLURALITY OF DIVINE NAMES ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY

[CAPUT TRIGINTA UNUM: Quod divina perfectio et pluralitas nominum divinorum divinae simplicitati non repugnant]

... [2] We have said that all the perfections found in other things are attributed to God in the same way as effects are found in their equivocal causes [sicut effectus in suis causis aequivocis inveniuntur]. These effects are in their causes virtually [in suis causis sunt virtute], as heat is in the sun. For, unless the power of the sun belonged to some extent to the genus of heat, the sun acting through this power would not generate anything like itself. …

So, too, the perfections of all things, which belong to the rest of things through diverse forms, must be attributed to God through one and the same power in Him [Deo secundum unam eius virtutem attribui]. This power is nothing other than His essence [Quae item virtus non est aliud a sua essentia], since, as we have proved [cf. SCG, I, 23], there can be no accident in God. Thus, therefore, God is called wise not only in so far as He produces wisdom, but also because, in so far as we are wise, we imitate to some extent the power by which He makes us wise [secundum quod sapientes sumus, virtutem eius, qua sapientes nos facit, aliquatenus imitamur]. On the other hand, God is not called a stone, even though He has made stones, because in the name stone there is understood a determinate mode of being according to which a stone is distinguished from God [quia in nomine lapidis intelligitur modus determinatus essendi, secundum quem lapis a Deo distinguitur]. But the stone imitates God as its cause in being and goodness, and other such characteristics, as do also the rest of creatures [Imitatur autem lapis Deum ut causam secundum esse, secundum bonitatem, et alia huiusmodi, sicut et aliae creaturae].

"…quia in nomine lapidis…" This addresses my worry in chapter 28 about how the perfection of, say, color can be in God, yet no color be in God. My response in that chapter was to say "that God possesses the excellence of color in the mode of causation and measure, rather than in any specific chromatic sense. After all, God qua ens summe perfectum infinitely transcends the finite mode of specific color. … This means whatever color can do is given to it by the power of God as first, preeminent cause…." I think that squares with Thomas' point here that "in nomine ______ intelligitur modus determinatus essendi".

[3] A similar situation obtains among the knowing and operative powers of man. For by its single power the intellect knows all the things that the sensitive part of the soul grasps through a diversity of powers [Intellectus enim unica virtute cognoscit omnia quae pars sensitiva diversis potentiis apprehendit]––and many other things as well. So, too, the higher an intellect is, the more it can know more things through one likeness [Intellectus etiam, quanto fuerit altior, tanto aliquo uno plura cognoscere potest], while a lesser intellect manages to know many things only through many likenesses [cognoscenda intellectus inferior non pertingit nisi per multa]. So, too, a ruling power extends to all those things to which diverse powers under it are ordered. In this way, therefore, through His one simple being God possesses every kind of perfection that all other things come to possess, but in a much more diminished way, through diverse principles.

"…intellectus inferior non pertingit…" The range of intellectual power can be seen in humans in the classroom. Smarter students need only one or two examples to grasp the principle, whereas those of lower intellect require numerous examples and repetitions to achieve understanding.

[4] From this we see the necessity of giving to God many names [necessitas plura nomina Deo dandi]. For, since we cannot know Him naturally except by arriving at Him from His effects [non possumus cognoscere naturaliter nisi ex effectibus deveniendo in ipsum], the names by which we signify His perfection must be diverse, just as the perfections belonging to things are found to be diverse [sicut et perfectiones in rebus inveniuntur diversae]. Were we able to understand the divine essence itself as it is and give to it the name that belongs to it, we would express it by only one name. This is promised to those who will see God through His essence: “In that day there shall be one Lord, and His name shall be one” (Zach. 14:9).

SCG, Book I, Chapter 30

Chapter 30: THE NAMES THAT CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD [Quae nomina de Deo possint praedicari]

… [2] Since it is possible to find in God every perfection of creatures, but in another and more eminent way, whatever names unqualifiedly designate a perfection without defect are predicated of God and of other things: for example, goodness, wisdom, being, and the like. But when any name expresses such perfections along with a mode that is proper to a creature, it can be said of God only according to likeness and metaphor [cum modo proprio creaturis, de Deo dici non potest nisi per similitudinem et metaphoram].

According to metaphor [Per metaphoram], what belongs to one thing is transferred to another, as when we say that a man is a stone because of the hardness of his intellect. Such names are used to designate the species of a created thing, for example, man and stone, for to each species belongs its own mode of perfection and being. The same is true of whatever names designate the properties of things, which are caused by the proper principles of their species. Hence, they can be said of God only metaphorically. But the names that express such perfections along with the mode of supereminence with which they belong to God [cum supereminentiae modo quo Deo conveniunt] are said of God alone [de solo Deo dicuntur]. Such names are the highest good, the first being, and the like.

[3] …[T]hat some of the aforementioned names signify a perfection without defect … is true with reference to that which the name was imposed to signify; for as to the mode of signification, every name is defective [absque defectu … quantum ad illud ad quod significandum nomen fuit impositum: quantum enim ad modum significandi, omne nomen cum defectu est]. For by means of a name we express things in the way in which the intellect conceives them [Nam nomine res exprimimus eo modo quo intellectu concipimus]. For our intellect, taking the origin of its knowledge from the senses, does not transcend the mode which is found in sensible things, in which the form and the subject of the form are not identical owing to the composition of form and matter [Intellectus autem noster, ex sensibus cognoscendi initium sumens, illum modum non transcendit qui in rebus sensibilibus invenitur, in quibus aliud est forma et habens formam, propter formae et materiae compositionem].

Now, a simple form is indeed found among such things, but one that is imperfect because it is not subsisting; on the other hand, though a subsisting subject of a form is found among sensible things, it is not simple but rather concreted. Whatever our intellect signifies as subsisting, therefore, it signifies in concretion [significat in concretione]; but what it signifies as simple, it signifies, not as that which is, but as that by which something is [quod vero ut simplex, significat non ut quod est, sed ut quo est].

As the annotated edition explains:

Concretionem habens. The concrete to St Thomas means the composite. Any existing created substance, as he teaches, is compounded of specific nature and individualising notes, of actuality and potentiality, of essence and existence. Thus, in creation, the abstract alone is simple, concrete being is compound. … Thus the concrete man is something that is: the abstract humanity is that whereby man is man, not something that is by itself.

As a result, with reference to the mode of signification there is in every name that we use an imperfection [in omni nomine a nobis dicto, quantum ad modum significandi, imperfectio invenitur], which does not befit God, even though the thing signified in some eminent way does befit God [res significata aliquo eminenti modo Deo conveniat]. This is clear in the name goodness and good. For goodness has signification as something not subsisting, while good has signification as something concreted. And so with reference to the mode of signification no name is fittingly applied to God; this is done only with reference to that which the name has been imposed to signify [quantum ad hoc nullum nomen Deo convenienter aptatur, sed solum quantum ad id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur]. Such names, therefore, as Dionysius teaches [De divinis nominibus I, 5, De caelesti hierarchia II, 3], can be both affirmed and denied of God. They can be affirmed because of the meaning of the name; they can be denied because of the mode of signification [affirmari quidem, propter nominis rationem; negari vero, propter significandi modum].

[4] Now, the mode of supereminence in which the abovementioned perfections are found in God can be signified by names used by us only through negation, as when we say that God is eternal or infinite, or also through a relation of God to other things, as when He is called the first cause or the highest good. For we cannot grasp what God is, but only what He is not and how other things are related to Him [Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum], as is clear from what we said above.